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On 09/17/2014 03:04 PM,
BM-2cUqBqHFVDHuY34ZcpL3PNgkpLUEEer8ev@bitmessage.ch wrote:
> Why is Tor wasting time in implementing secure hidden services? Why not
> copy from here if they are doing it right:
> 
> Tor	I2P
> Cell	Message
> Client	Router or Client
> Circuit	Tunnel
> Directory	NetDb
> Directory Server	Floodfill Router
> Entry Guards	Fast Peers
> Entry Node	Inproxy
> Exit Node	Outproxy
> Hidden Service	Eepsite or Destination
> Hidden Service Descriptor	LeaseSet
> Introduction point	Inbound Gateway
> Node	Router
> Onion Proxy	I2PTunnel Client (more or less)
> Relay	Router
> Rendezvous Point	somewhat like Inbound Gateway + Outbound Endpoint
> Router Descriptor	RouterInfo
> Server	Router
> 
> Why not distributed directory authorities and hardcoded?

Huh? Tor uses distributed directory authorities, and the main ones are
hardcoded in the software.

> Why not secure tunnels independent of guards?

Using entry guards protects against Sybil attacks.

> Or does Tor want to remain less secure?

;)

See
http://tor.stackexchange.com/questions/27/how-does-tors-threat-model-differ-from-i2ps-threat-model.
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