Delivery-Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2014 05:50:23 -0400
Return-Path: <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on moria.seul.org
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.4 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED,
	FREEMAIL_FROM,RCVD_IN_BL_SPAMCOP_NET,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,RP_MATCHES_RCVD,
	T_DKIM_INVALID autolearn=ham version=3.3.1
X-Original-To: archiver@seul.org
Delivered-To: archiver@seul.org
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (eugeni.torproject.org [38.229.72.13])
	(using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits))
	(No client certificate requested)
	by khazad-dum.seul.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AB4EA1E0A4E;
	Tue,  9 Sep 2014 05:50:21 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D203A2F415;
	Tue,  9 Sep 2014 09:50:17 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E82552F40E
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Tue,  9 Sep 2014 09:50:14 +0000 (UTC)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at eugeni.torproject.org
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org ([127.0.0.1])
 by localhost (eugeni.torproject.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
 with ESMTP id boav30Dq13kX for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>;
 Tue,  9 Sep 2014 09:50:14 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from forward5l.mail.yandex.net (forward5l.mail.yandex.net
 [84.201.143.138])
 (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits))
 (Client CN "forwards.mail.yandex.net",
 Issuer "Certum Level IV CA" (not verified))
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B85E12EF16
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Tue,  9 Sep 2014 09:50:14 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from smtp2h.mail.yandex.net (smtp2h.mail.yandex.net [84.201.187.145])
 by forward5l.mail.yandex.net (Yandex) with ESMTP id E930CC4190B
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Tue,  9 Sep 2014 13:50:08 +0400 (MSK)
Received: from smtp2h.mail.yandex.net (localhost [127.0.0.1])
 by smtp2h.mail.yandex.net (Yandex) with ESMTP id 99A1E17056C9
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Tue,  9 Sep 2014 13:50:08 +0400 (MSK)
Received: from c-217-115-50-229.cust.bredband2.com
 (c-217-115-50-229.cust.bredband2.com [217.115.50.229])
 by smtp2h.mail.yandex.net (nwsmtp/Yandex) with ESMTPSA id KTUo5CUSXf-o5t0u5Iu; 
 Tue,  9 Sep 2014 13:50:07 +0400
 (using SSLv3 with cipher AES128-SHA (128/128 bits))
 (Client certificate not present)
X-Yandex-Uniq: e44e0a71-6b80-4d6b-bf82-3382dd9a3e0f
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=yandex.com; s=mail;
 t=1410256208; bh=oHp6/yTVU98HnWIdyng8Cbaomp+gq3r0N8dg1EgI818=;
 h=Date:From:To:Subject:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References:X-Mailer:
 Mime-Version:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding;
 b=hslOeGjbJEUUd/AFLh7VoJPIGRrVNHVJF3tpqZ+nxntb7lrxPNGizDxCChPgc+DK+
 4ID43n3ZOfAtLhHbQOnluSpVWtB7VM6xos4KYo8NTKzDDa3RxB1AN6wC3IuCa2egl6
 svumjmQrws5j3GuGc3heS+ZQB7J8BesW+yJlJ4pY=
Authentication-Results: smtp2h.mail.yandex.net; dkim=pass header.i=@yandex.com
Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2014 19:49:50 +1000
From: Katya Titov <kattitov@yandex.com>
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Message-ID: <20140909194950.433b73cc@localhost.localdomain>
In-Reply-To: <b76aa2e8c95900b9a65d43f3ac68fe2b@cryptolab.net>
References: <20140909000553.GN8132@moria.seul.org>
 <b76aa2e8c95900b9a65d43f3ac68fe2b@cryptolab.net>
X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.8.1 (GTK+ 2.24.10; x86_64-pc-linux-gnu)
Mime-Version: 1.0
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] What should our 31c3 talk be?
X-BeenThere: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
Reply-To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
List-Id: "all discussion about theory, design,
 and development of Onion Routing" <tor-talk.lists.torproject.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/>
List-Post: <mailto:tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Errors-To: tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org
Sender: "tor-talk" <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>

Griffin Boyce:
> Roger Dingledine wrote:
>> Two lessons I've learned from recent CCC talks:
>> 
>> A) Social commentary works much better than technical things. That
>> is, the audience respects us for our technical work, and now they
>> want to hear
>> our perspective on what's going on in the world. So while my
>> instinct is to use the talks to make the audience more technically
>> competent and thus more able to help us in this growing global
>> conflict, the talks that work best these days are more like social
>> rallies.
> 
>    I think it makes more sense to start from the beginning.  Talk
> about the social problems that Tor tries to solve, and then talk
> about the technical ways that Tor actually solves them.  Domestic
> Violence victims are easily tracked via email and other means, so
> using tor will help prevent that by giving them a different IP
> address and preventing niche attacks that are otherwise hard to
> mitigate.  People with serious medical concerns use it to keep their
> private information private. Everything from pregnancy to rape to
> transgender status can cause someone's personal data to be more
> valuable to big corporations -- or put them at risk of death,
> depending on location.  Someone wants to look up OSHA regulations
> anonymously and maybe file a complaint about their dangerous
> workplace -- Tor helps make sure they're really anonymous through the
> magic of onion routing.  Anonymous bloggers and journalists need it
> for the same reason.

I tend to agree with this. It may also lead on to topics such as what
threats are being effectively addressed/mitigated and what threats Tor
does not currently protect you from. It does seem that illegal activity
(as evidenced through the Silk Road take down and operation Torpedo) is
being actively targeted and people are being identified and arrested,
although not necessarily through vulnerabilities in Tor. An exploration
of who has the capabilities to unmask Tor users and why/how would be
interesting.

This may also lead into #3 (sponsors) and could provide some food for
thought.
-- 
kat
-- 
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

