Delivery-Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 12:25:37 -0400
Return-Path: <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on moria.seul.org
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED,
	RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,T_DKIM_INVALID,T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD,UNPARSEABLE_RELAY
	autolearn=ham version=3.3.1
X-Original-To: archiver@seul.org
Delivered-To: archiver@seul.org
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (eugeni.torproject.org [38.229.72.13])
	(using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits))
	(No client certificate requested)
	by khazad-dum.seul.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 995D51E042C;
	Thu,  1 Oct 2015 12:25:35 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 62DDF37CD8;
	Thu,  1 Oct 2015 16:25:30 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A523337CCD
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Thu,  1 Oct 2015 16:25:27 +0000 (UTC)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at 
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org ([127.0.0.1])
 by localhost (eugeni.torproject.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
 with ESMTP id wL6hG5o80IdL for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>;
 Thu,  1 Oct 2015 16:25:27 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from mx1.riseup.net (mx1.riseup.net [198.252.153.129])
 (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits))
 (Client CN "*.riseup.net",
 Issuer "COMODO RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA" (not verified))
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 80A3937580
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Thu,  1 Oct 2015 16:25:27 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from cotinga.riseup.net (unknown [10.0.1.161])
 (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
 (Client CN "*.riseup.net",
 Issuer "COMODO RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA" (verified OK))
 by mx1.riseup.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E9E25C175F;
 Thu,  1 Oct 2015 09:25:23 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=riseup.net; s=squak;
 t=1443716724; bh=B0KtSBffNpfeLAZEEMupWylUhaHuetnwbOi4sPy6Zh0=;
 h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From;
 b=lOlgBEPLXyj2oUEh1CDofylpSnPW7Ll+jMu/1k4pl4rzZCtuE+mheUvc1Xa7Qoqtj
 drG5Pf0GdFrsxReoZPxGgBVWJTAPnxW4T7L7vYn2VfC4Q0Vv1Vxw13Cpc2llgI+qTh
 ILZQIrvPLCWta4XkU8oWsbD7wWocAuP+E/+1i6aY=
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1])
 (Authenticated sender: pacifica) with ESMTPSA id D01241C0428
MIME-Version: 1.0
Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2015 16:25:23 +0000
From: pacifica@riseup.net
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
In-Reply-To: <40db98cc43b11641d7a0cd60fc455723@openmailbox.org>
References: <7757388edf9790a0fad5afca48569b52@riseup.net>
 <560AAAC9.4020001@gmail.com> <20150929191615.GA27026@dinah>
 <40db98cc43b11641d7a0cd60fc455723@openmailbox.org>
Message-ID: <e75df0cb2d9f2b00674a21705e5437d5@riseup.net>
X-Sender: pacifica@riseup.net
User-Agent: Riseup mail
X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.98.7 at mx1.riseup.net
X-Virus-Status: Clean
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] New methods / research to detect add-ons?
X-BeenThere: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
Reply-To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
List-Id: "all discussion about theory, design,
 and development of Onion Routing" <tor-talk.lists.torproject.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/>
List-Post: <mailto:tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; Format="flowed"
Errors-To: tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org
Sender: "tor-talk" <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>

>> That practice would be almost universally discouraged, except perhaps
>> for some imaginative fringe cases.
>> 
> 
> That's us.

Eh, I'd hesitate to say "us". I'm _not_ advocating for using add-ons in 
TBB, I'm just looking for ways to quantify the damage to anonymity.

> Being part of an identified heard isn't as good as everyone
> being unique every session/circuit.

I've also got to strongly disagree here... if you're looking for 
anonymity and privacy, the "herd" is strong protection against that 
because trackers cannot single you out from the thousands of other 
users. If you are unique, then tracking you over the current session is 
trivial. Insofar that all Tor users look alike (I realize that is an 
oversimplified premise), tracking across sessions is also not fruitful.

And since it's Tor, we're not really trying to hide from the fact that 
we're using Tor... it doesn't make sense since the IP will always give 
you away.

Again, I can't reiterate enough... I'm not advocating for using add-ons 
as some have, because I do agree with the (afaik undisputed) logic that 
using add-ons in TBB harms your anonymity.

Thanks,

pacifica

On 2015-09-30 07:04, Spencer wrote:
> Hi,
> 
>> 
>> pacifica:
>> The closest thing I'm aware of to a one-stop-shop to view the factors
>> of your fingerprint would be Valve's fingerprint.js library:
>> 
>> https://github.com/Valve/fingerprintjs2
>> 
> 
> Thanks for this; I will definitely use it :)
> 
>> 
>> It's important to consider TBB's design...
>> 
> 
> It is. Being part of an identified heard isn't as good as everyone
> being unique every session/circuit.  Though I don't think the outcome
> outweighs the effort yet, which is why we have the heard. But if that
> individuality was built in it would.
> 
>> 
>> That practice would be almost universally discouraged, except perhaps
>> for some imaginative fringe cases.
>> 
> 
> That's us.
> 
> Wordlife,
> Spencer

-- 
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

