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From: Virgil Griffith <i@virgil.gr>
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2015 03:31:31 +0000
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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] [tor-dev] Desired exit node diversity
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Instead of WOT, it seems more desirable, and better fit diversity, to have
both your best friends and worst enemies on the same circuit. Ergo,
minimizing chance of collaboration.

-V
On Mon, 26 Oct 2015 at 01:30 grarpamp <grarpamp@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 8:44 AM, tor-dev had:
> > I agree with Roger that ideally all relays can be exits (and since
> > we're being ideal, we'll assume that 'exit' means to every port). And
> > the network location distribution of relays by bandwidth is
> > proportional to both the client destination selection over time and
> > general Internet traffic over time, which match each other since we're
> > being ideal, and also matter since we're using an ideal trust-aware path
> > selection algorithm. And network wide route selection is such that
> > there is no congestion (generalizing Roger's assumption of infinite
> > exit capacity).
>
> Guessing that... assuming you can ship and calculate all the relay
> data / DHT / weights / KEX / circuits / preferences without
> bogging down your network or cpu...
>
> More relays being exits yields higher maximum possible path diversity.
> More relays being exits yields higher potential aggregate throughput
> between the network and clearnet.
> More exits yields broader more complete location overlay relavent to
> users (more relays yields more guards), datacenteres, and clearnet
> services (though there's as yet no attempt to exit near a service
> unless done manually).
>
> However when subject to global passive adversary tapping
> lots of the fiber, and you turn up more relays as exits (which
> are also non-exit relays by nature), you're adding lots more
> unused bandwidth over the same current consumption, leading
> to lots of unused quiet portions of the network.
> Which seems a greater potential for the adversary to "look, user
> just shot a unique traffic pattern completely through the quiet
> zone, gotcha".
> Whereas when the network links are full with clocked traffic
> (and fill traffic if there would otherwise be slack space) that
> observation attack is hardly as possible, to relavently impossible.
>
> If true, it seems to me adding more [non] exits should be pegged to
> some metrics and solicited on need / planning rather than turning
> up 6000 exits all at once.
>
> > In our ongoing work on trust-aware path selection, we assume a trust
> > distribution that will be the default used by a Tor client if another
> > distribution is not specified. (Most users will not have a reasoned
> > understanding of who they actually need to worry most about, and even
> > if they somehow got that right would not have a good handle how that
> > adversary's resources are distributed.)  We call this adversary "The
> > Man", who is equally likely to be everywhere (each AS) on the
> > network. For relay adversaries, we assume that standing up and running
> > a relay has costs so weight a bit to make relays that have been around
> > a long time slightly more likely to be trusted.
>
> tor-relays had talk of individual humans keyparty signing their relays
> and including that WOT along with other trust and meta metrics
> in the consensus or other queryable datastore that could be used
> by the user to select preferred relay sets in whichever sensible or
> silly ways suited them.
>
> An adversary standing up relays has costs.
> Adversaries standing their human agents in public, even if
> their undercover is maintained, has additional costs and risks.
>
> > You
> > would then be faced with the political nightmare of issuing default
> > policies that tells users they should route with a weighting that says
> > country foo has an x percent chance of being your adversary, but
> > country bar has a y percent chance. (Likewise also have similar
> > statements that substitute 'large multinational corp.', 'major
> > criminal organization', 'specific big government agency that is
> > getting all the press lately' etc.  for "country" in the last
> > sentence.)
>
> ========
> In a sense this is like the original 'valid' flag, which you got
> by mailing me and having me manually approve your relay (and without
> which you would never be used as the entry or exit point in a circuit).
> Periodically I wonder if we should go back to a design like that, where
> users won't pick exit relays that don't have the "socially connected"
> badge. Then I opt against wanting it, since I worry that we'd lose
> exactly the kind of diversity we need most, by cutting out the relays
> whose operators we don't know.
>
> But both sides of that are just guessing. Let's find out!
> ========
>
>
> These type of things may be better suited to a system
> where the users contribute their research and knowledge
> about the network into the network metadata db, and the
> users can query it to make their own decisions, follow
> other users prebuilt selection templates, or stick
> with the provided defaults.
> _______________________________________________
> tor-dev mailing list
> tor-dev@lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
>
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