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From: tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org
Subject: tor-talk Digest, Vol 57, Issue 22
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2015 12:00:01 +0000

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--Anexo de Mensagem Encaminhado--
From: marcoskehl@hotmail.com
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2015 17:38:16 +0000
Subject: [tor-talk] Super speed Tor

Hello cripto experts!
 
1. When we will have a super speed Tor? I mean, a HD video streaming from a hidden service.
    When we have around 10 million relays + 10 millions exit nodes? Or Tor will aways be slow as a lame turtle, due to its low latency design and privacy concerns?
 
2. Is the bandwith my ISP provides me (it is 2 MB), the bandwith of the the middle nodes, or the bandwith of the exit node, that determines my speed under the deep web? Or a combination of all above?
 
3. Do we have some projection for the Tor speed over the next years?
 
Cheers!
    
 		 	   		  


--Anexo de Mensagem Encaminhado--
From: info@tvdw.eu
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2015 19:46:27 +0200
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Super speed Tor

Hi Marcos,
 
1. Do you run a relay yourself yet?
2. Combination of all of them
3. Current speed is good, in the future it will either get better, stay 
the same, or get worse, depending on how much the community contributes.
 
Tom
 
Thank you for answering Tom. 
1. I use Tails with Persistence mode, and, as far as I know, Tails does not allow me to
   be a relay. Am I correct? 
   I have my first contact with Tor in a CompTia Network 005 
course (thank you a lot professormesser.com), here in Brasil,when studing about proxies. I remember the option of setting up a relay in Windows TBB. 
I really like the idea of contributing as a relay, but since I started
using Tails, I did not find this option. And I am pretty sure I will never
use Tor inside Windows enviroment again. I nuked this bad behavior from orbit, after
learn something about digital forensics.   
    Also, I respect and admire the Whonix team, but, for me, Tails is almost the perfect
O.S. to go. 
 
Furthermore, I would like to recommend you folks, the very intersting videos of 
Adrian Crenshaw, from Irongeek.com about the "Darknets".

To finish, I would like your opinion about packet captions from Tor Network, running
 Wireshark or similar. I know a little from the topologie of 
 entry guards - middle nodes - exit nodes,
and how it is "safe" diving among the middle nodes from the adversary running Wireshark
at his exit node in the end of the World. But, what kind of packets an 
adversary could catch if I am using Tor behind a NAT and this adversary 
is running Wireshark behind that same NAT, we both inside the same intranet. Or if this 
adversary is inside my ISP, knowing I am connect to Tor, maybe hacking NSA 
and their "freedon fighters buddies" of FSA?
Sorry if I typed something wrong or if I was not clear about my
doubts, English is not my native language and I am not an expert as many of
you are. 

Thanks!

 

 




 
 
 
Op 13/10/15 om 19:38 schreef Marcos Eugenio Kehl:
> Hello cripto experts!
>
> 1. When we will have a super speed Tor? I mean, a HD video streaming from a hidden service.
>      When we have around 10 million relays + 10 millions exit nodes? Or Tor will aways be slow as a lame turtle, due to its low latency design and privacy concerns?
>
> 2. Is the bandwith my ISP provides me (it is 2 MB), the bandwith of the the middle nodes, or the bandwith of the exit node, that determines my speed under the deep web? Or a combination of all above?
>
> 3. Do we have some projection for the Tor speed over the next years?
>
> Cheers!
>
>   		 	   		
>
 


--Anexo de Mensagem Encaminhado--
From: i@virgil.gr
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2015 17:49:47 +0000
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Super speed Tor

At current growth rates it will be a while.
 
https://research.torproject.org/techreports/tor-growth-2014-10-04.pdf
 
On Tue, 13 Oct 2015 at 10:44 Marcos Eugenio Kehl <marcoskehl@hotmail.com>
wrote:
 
> Hello cripto experts!
>
> 1. When we will have a super speed Tor? I mean, a HD video streaming from
> a hidden service.
>     When we have around 10 million relays + 10 millions exit nodes? Or Tor
> will aways be slow as a lame turtle, due to its low latency design and
> privacy concerns?
>
> 2. Is the bandwith my ISP provides me (it is 2 MB), the bandwith of the
> the middle nodes, or the bandwith of the exit node, that determines my
> speed under the deep web? Or a combination of all above?
>
> 3. Do we have some projection for the Tor speed over the next years?
>
> Cheers!
>
>
> --
> tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
>
 
Thank you too, Virgil and Monoko Satou.

--Anexo de Mensagem Encaminhado--
From: netdiver@sigaint.org
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2015 02:35:36 +0000
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Super speed Tor

 
> 1. When we will have a super speed Tor? I mean, a HD video streaming from a hidden service.
>     When we have around 10 million relays + 10 millions exit nodes? Or Tor will aways be slow as a lame turtle, due to its low latency design and privacy concerns?
 
Current Tor connection speed is pretty neat, few years ago it was much
slower, like in order of magnitude slower. If you find Tor slow, maybe
it's time to contribute? I myself contribute for that reason, serving
some relays/exits on 100Mbit-1Gbit lanes. If you don't want to run a
relay yourself, maybe it'd be a good idea to donate few bucks to those
who do? torservers.net for example.
 
> 2. Is the bandwith my ISP provides me (it is 2 MB), the bandwith of the the middle nodes, or the bandwith of the exit node, that determines my speed under the deep web? Or a combination of all above?
 
You've answered yourself :-)
 
> 3. Do we have some projection for the Tor speed over the next years?
 
i@virgil.gr mentioned
https://research.torproject.org/techreports/tor-growth-2014-10-04.pdf
 
-- Monoko Satou, Abuse Department @ netdive.xyz
 


--Anexo de Mensagem Encaminhado--
From: gk@torproject.org
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2015 08:06:23 +0000
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Making TBB undetectable!

aka:
> Wasn't Mozilla working on a Firefox which uses Tor for "Private Browsing"?
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/Privacy/Roadmap/Tor
> If millions of people would use the same Firefox on the same version
> with mostly the same browser/javascript behaviour, it would make TBB
> obsolete. Wouldn't it make more sense to include those anonymity patches
> into the mainline Firefox and make them opt-in if the user uses Private
> Browsing?
 
Yes. We (and Mozilla) are working on that. We already got quite an
amount of patches upstreamed. More are coming...
 
Georg
 
 
 		 	   		  
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