Delivery-Date: Wed, 01 Oct 2014 14:34:42 -0400
Return-Path: <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on moria.seul.org
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED,
	RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,RP_MATCHES_RCVD,T_DKIM_INVALID,UNPARSEABLE_RELAY
	autolearn=ham version=3.3.1
X-Original-To: archiver@seul.org
Delivered-To: archiver@seul.org
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (eugeni.torproject.org [38.229.72.13])
	(using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits))
	(No client certificate requested)
	by khazad-dum.seul.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 572171E04FF;
	Wed,  1 Oct 2014 14:34:41 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8F58F2CED4;
	Wed,  1 Oct 2014 18:34:38 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8824E26DEC
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Wed,  1 Oct 2014 18:34:34 +0000 (UTC)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at eugeni.torproject.org
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org ([127.0.0.1])
 by localhost (eugeni.torproject.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
 with ESMTP id EsmtNssMsBnP for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>;
 Wed,  1 Oct 2014 18:34:34 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from mx1.riseup.net (mx1.riseup.net [198.252.153.129])
 (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits))
 (Client CN "*.riseup.net", Issuer "Gandi Standard SSL CA" (not verified))
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 594BF26DE9
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Wed,  1 Oct 2014 18:34:34 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from plantcutter.riseup.net (plantcutter-pn.riseup.net [10.0.1.121])
 (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
 (Client CN "*.riseup.net", Issuer "Gandi Standard SSL CA" (not verified))
 by mx1.riseup.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A59AC562DD
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Wed,  1 Oct 2014 11:34:31 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=riseup.net; s=squak;
 t=1412188471; bh=QoanU/jkqs27iVqVTF7XcLByrnW8bMlZOn3xjOXy5Gc=;
 h=Date:From:To:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From;
 b=rs67DfiBeT6KGhPuluhrv/aCu108bIvBo4dRECyrbTd3gbEmxUXBMtsYJYTjQCmyW
 V/YPgkBF/3ezH1JJX+H2zro6OKGiVuG40W8tgiTp16txR7xV1Y+p9lzbIfe7XoMW+d
 xuuEqXcWo63KH5eIbOmc80hDnxy5227ySrvCEqfc=
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1])
 (Authenticated sender: mirimir) with ESMTPSA id D530723B13
Message-ID: <542C4930.5050207@riseup.net>
Date: Wed, 01 Oct 2014 12:34:24 -0600
From: Mirimir <mirimir@riseup.net>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64;
 rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.1.2
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
References: <006e01cfdd7f$9fa4b370$deee1a50$@alizeepathology.com>
 <542C2D15.2020101@riseup.net>
 <012401cfdda3$01978a30$04c69e90$@alizeepathology.com>
In-Reply-To: <012401cfdda3$01978a30$04c69e90$@alizeepathology.com>
X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.98.4 at mx1
X-Virus-Status: Clean
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Wikimedia and Tor
X-BeenThere: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
Reply-To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
List-Id: "all discussion about theory, design,
 and development of Onion Routing" <tor-talk.lists.torproject.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/>
List-Post: <mailto:tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Errors-To: tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org
Sender: "tor-talk" <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>

On 10/01/2014 12:10 PM, Derric Atzrott wrote:

<SNIP>

>> Even imposing a nontrivial cost for creating accounts (say 10 BTC) would
>> not help. Determined adversaries would pay it. And of course, that would
>> exclude numerous innocents who wouldn't or couldn't pay.
> 
> Yeah, I was just listing off some items that we came up with brainstorming
> over the past few years.  Clearly that item was cut fairly quickly.  Some
> type of proof of work might work, so long as it was expensive enough to
> deter attackers after the first few times while still cheap enough to
> generate just once for well behaved actors.

Wikimedia could authenticate users with GnuPG keys. As part of the
process of creating a new account, Wikimedia could randomly specify the
key ID (or even a longer piece of the fingerprint) of the key that the
user needs to generate. Generating the key would require arbitrarily
great effort, but would impose negligible cost on Wikimedia or users
during subsequent use. Although there's nothing special about such GnuPG
keys as proof of work, they're more generally useful.
-- 
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

