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Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2014 23:00:47 -0400
From: Paul Syverson <paul.syverson@nrl.navy.mil>
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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Stupid hidden services question
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On Mon, Oct 06, 2014 at 07:49:38PM -0600, Mirimir wrote:
> On 10/06/2014 07:26 PM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> > I'm attempting to quantify the proportion of traffic used by hidden
> > services. When connecting to hidden services, are exit nodes ever used
> > (unless the exit node also has a guard flag)?
> 
> The nodes in client and hidden-service circuits that are adjacent to the
> rendezvous node are in some sense analogous to exit nodes. However, I'm
> virtually certain that there's no exit flag required. On the other hand,
> I'm not aware that nodes with exit and/or guard flags are excluded from
> circuits involving hidden services.
> 

The client and/or HS choose their guards as usual. All other relays in
both Intro Circuits and both Rendezvous Circuits in a HS access are
chosen with the bandwidth-weighted probability of being chosen as a
middle node.

aloha,
Paul
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