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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Stupid hidden services question
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On 10/06/2014 07:26 PM, Virgil Griffith wrote:
> I'm attempting to quantify the proportion of traffic used by hidden
> services. When connecting to hidden services, are exit nodes ever used
> (unless the exit node also has a guard flag)?

The nodes in client and hidden-service circuits that are adjacent to the
rendezvous node are in some sense analogous to exit nodes. However, I'm
virtually certain that there's no exit flag required. On the other hand,
I'm not aware that nodes with exit and/or guard flags are excluded from
circuits involving hidden services.

> 
> -V
> 
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