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Date: Mon, 01 Dec 2014 02:24:46 +0000
From: fuckyouhosting@ruggedinbox.com
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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] =?utf-8?q?=28D=29DOS_over_Tor_network_=3F_Help_!?=
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On 2014-12-01 01:46, fuckyouhosting@ruggedinbox.com wrote:
> Hi List! We (try to) maintain a free hosting platform for hidden
> service websites, here: http://fuckyouhotwkd3xh.onion
> but recently all the hosted hidden services became unreachable.
> 
> Tor logs are correctly reporting the problem:
> 
> Dec 01 XXX [notice] Your Guard SoylentGreen (XXX) is failing more
> circuits than usual. Most likely this means the Tor network is
> overloaded. Success counts are 147/210. Use counts are 86/86. 147
> circuits completed, 0 were unusable, 1 collapsed, and 1000 timed out.
> For reference, your timeout cutoff is 60 seconds.
> 
> Dec 01 XXX [notice] Your Guard regar42 (XXX) is failing more circuits
> than usual. Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded.
> Success counts are 122/178. Use counts are 91/92. 137 circuits
> completed, 15 were unusable, 0 collapsed, and 17 timed out. For
> reference, your timeout cutoff is 113 seconds.
> 
> ...
> 
> trying to change the Guard, by deleting the /var/lib/tor/state file,
> results in the same problem and logs, just with a different Guard.
> 
> Trying to host just our hidden service (fuckyouhotwkd3xh.onion),
> by deleting all the other hidden services in the torrc file,
> 'solves' the problem .. logs looks ok and the service is reachable.
> 
> It looks like we are hosting an 'offending' hidden service
> which is the target of a (D)DOS attack.
> 
> We tried to enable Tor debugging and to sniff some traffic
> but were unable to find the offending hidden service.
> 
> All the access.log and error.log of the hosted websites are ok,
> they don't grow in size and don't log any flood.
> 
> Even the bandwidth usage of the server looks ok, basically there is no 
> traffic.
> 
> 
> So .. question: is there a way to understand which hidden service is
> causing all this ?
> 
> Suggestions are welcome!
> 
> Thank you.

Hi again, it looks like we are in good company: 
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-November/035787.html 
(Isolating a hidden service hit by DDOS)
sorry for not noticing that before, we'll try to follow the same 
advises.
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