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Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2014 19:42:42 -0500
From: Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Netflow analysis breaks Tor
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On Fri, Nov 14, 2014 at 06:20:16PM -0500, grarpamp wrote:
> Professor Sambuddho Chakravarty, a former researcher at Columbia
> University???s Network Security Lab and now researching Network
> Anonymity and Privacy at the Indraprastha Institute of Information
> Technology in Delhi, has co-published a series of papers over the last
> six years outlining the attack vector, and claims a 100% ???decloaking???
> success rate under laboratory conditions, and 81.4% in the actual
> wilds of the Tor network.
> 
> http://thestack.com/chakravarty-tor-traffic-analysis-141114
> https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?techreportID=1545&format=pdf

I put up a few pointers here for readers to get up to speed:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows

There sure are a lot of things going on in Tor-land these days, but I
don't think this has much to do with any of the other recent stories.
Rather, some journalist thought this would be a great time to drop
another story.

In summary, it's great to see more research on traffic confirmation
attacks, but a) traffic confirmation attacks are not a new area so don't
freak out without actually reading the papers, and b) this particular one,
while kind of neat, doesn't supercede all the previous papers.

--Roger

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