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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Could Tor be used for health informatics?
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Paul Templeton writes:

> Where Tor may fit...
> 
> The Tor network would provide the secure transport - each site would create an onion address. Central servers would keep tab of address and public keys for each site and practitioner.

I'm not convinced this is a good tradeoff for this application.  The
crypto in the current version of hidden services is weaker in several
respects than what you would get from an ordinary HTTPS connection.
These users probably don't need (or want?) location anonymity for either
side of the connection and may not appreciate the extra latency and
possible occasional reachability problems associated with the hidden
service connection.

-- 
Seth Schoen  <schoen@eff.org>
Senior Staff Technologist                       https://www.eff.org/
Electronic Frontier Foundation                  https://www.eff.org/join
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