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From: teor <teor2345@gmail.com>
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Date: Sat, 9 May 2015 16:52:13 +1000
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> On 9 May 2015, at 12:21 , tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org wrote:
>=20
> Message: 7
> Date: Fri, 8 May 2015 19:21:29 -0700
> From: coderman <coderman@gmail.com>
> To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Friendly LAN bridge -- bad idea?
> Message-ID:
> 	=
<CAJVRA1Ss+eBQO8BxcaVCy+SnZLX6SNbHYAtKF66S2XsweeFRqg@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3DUTF-8
>=20
> On 5/8/15, l.m <ter.one.leeboi@hush.com> wrote:
>>> There may be other security implications of a shared Tor client.
>>=20
>> Such as
>>=20
>> 1. All users that share a tor client also share a threat model. The
>> tor configuration is shared. This may not be an ideal property.
>> 2. If one user of the shared tor client breaks the process--it's
>> broken for all others. Which is to say a bug, exploit, failure will
>> affect all users simultaneously.
>=20
> there are also stream isolation concerns, see options
> IsolateClientAddr, IsolateSOCKSAuth, IsolateClientProtocol,
> IsolateDestPort, IsolateDestAddr, etc.
>=20
> better to have each client run their own Tor, and a router / gateway
> which can tell Tor Launcher a specific bridge or PT for Tor network
> access.

I want to correct earlier advice about trading separate external guards =
per client for a single bridge for all clients:
* in either case, network-level observers will know that people at your =
institution use Tor
* if your local bridge is compromised, all your users could be =
de-anonymised; if a guard is compromised, one of your users could be =
de-anonymised. So using a bridge would be like assigning the same guard =
to all the users at your institution, reducing the chances that one =
person is using a compromised guard, at the cost of having you all =
de-anonymised at once if that happens to your bridge.
Tor uses guards for this very reason - it's better to have a very small =
chance of having all connections compromised, than a large chance of =
having some connections compromised.

If your threat model includes government or institutional log or =
monitoring requests, that's worth considering, too.

It really depends how resistant your local bridge is to compromise, =
institutional, and legal pressure.

Aggregating Tor traffic can be great for privacy - "no, we know you =
traced it back here, but can't tell you who it was", but only if you =
avoid logging connections between the clients and the bridge. So make =
sure (detailed) logging is turned off on any clients, intermediate =
routers or firewalls, and on the bridge itself.

teor

teor2345 at gmail dot com
pgp 0xABFED1AC
https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5

teor at blah dot im
OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7


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