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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Friendly LAN bridge -- bad idea?
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I'm thinking...

Making direct connections per user/device to Tor would help.

Assuming many devices and x number of 'usual guests' would mean much
cover traffic. Spreading the cover goodness over many different relays
is optimal, no?

Unless all of your devices and users are malevolent, more is better. If
they are all malevolent, well you've got other issues at hand, but I
suspect in that case a single connection would be better - to reduce
your overall footprint. (But again, depending on the level of
malevolence, there are always attack vectors to exploit.)

My rationale is purely based on the theory of a larger anonymity set
being better for Tor as a whole, and not on the technicalities of your
user's actions, nor necessarily on the level of protection for your
individual users/devices.

I have been known to be wrong, so if anyone wishes to disagree with me,
please do.


Matt
Speak Freely
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