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Date: Thu, 28 May 2015 16:53:41 +0200
From: Moritz Bartl <moritz@torservers.net>
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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Hidden Service Shared Hosting Platform
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Hi Thomas,

Great! I've been toying with the idea for quite a while now, too. Glad
that someone is picking it up. :-) It would be ideal to find a way to
make it hard even for yourself to find out whether a particular hidden
service is hosted by you. I didn't really spend too much time thinking
about it, but one idea I've had is to spin up and bootstrap 'remote' VM
instances (on servers maintained by third parties) that you than hand
over to individuals, complete with an interface for users to easily
generate more hostnames/virtual hosts on 'their' VM. Apart from some
update channels you could lock down the systems so you don't have easy
access. You could still check whether a certain VM has been paid for,
but you don't have to know about the hostnames generated on the VMs.

I don't see a good way to achieve this if you maintain the VM hosts
yourself. Maybe one can built it so users decrypt their hidden services
(keys) on reboot so they're only available in RAM.

If we think hard enough, there's probably a nice way to keep the
relationship of users (and their payments) and running hidden services
separate (or at least hard/expensive to recover).

Good luck!
-- 
Moritz Bartl
https://www.torservers.net/
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