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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] .onion name gen
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So it's not who is already published in the list but whoever has published most recently? Very confused now. Seems like that works completely backwards from how it should. 

> On Mar 4, 2016, at 4:05 PM, Mirimir <mirimir@riseup.net> wrote:
> 
>> On 03/04/2016 01:39 PM, Scfith Rise up wrote:
>> It _would_ be the same private key. Good luck with generating 1.2
>> septillion permutations (16^32).
> 
> That's not what I get from
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/HiddenServiceNames.
> SHA1 collisions are possible.
> 
>> But could be doable in a few years so to answer your question, I
>> believe there can only be one published in the HSDIR, so first come
>> first served. Facebook's would have to be DDOS / shutdown and then
>> the forged one can be spun up and published.
> 
> As I understand it, what matters is which one announced most recently.
> 
>> Please correct me if I'm wrong as I've only been researching Tor since 2015. 
>> 
>>>> On Mar 4, 2016, at 3:23 PM, Mirimir <mirimir@riseup.net> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> On 03/04/2016 01:03 PM, Andreas Krey wrote:
>>>>> On Fri, 04 Mar 2016 19:55:01 +0000, Flipchan wrote:
>>>>> IF i generate a .onion domain , isnt there a risk that someone can generate the same domain? I mean anyone can generate .onion domains and IF i got an easy .onion address then some could easily generate that rsa key right?
>>>> 
>>>> There is no 'easy' onion address, only ones that look like they
>>>> are. Faking facebookcorewwwi takes the same effort as any other.
>>>> Getting an onion that starts with facebook but does not end in
>>>> corewwwi is much easier (by the factor 1099511627775), but that
>>>> is true for any other eight character prefix as well.
>>>> 
>>>> Andreas
>>> 
>>> OK, but let's say that someone got facebookcorewwwi.onion, running
>>> scallion on some mega-GPU monster. It's hugely improbable, I know. And
>>> they'd have a different private key, of course. But how would Tor handle
>>> that? Would it work like running multiple onion copies does now? That
>>> is, would they compete for HSDir priority?
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