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Date: Sat, 07 Mar 2015 09:54:23 -0500
To: "Dan Cristian Octavian" <danoctavian91@gmail.com>,
 "tor-talk" <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>
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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] personal note
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On 3/5/2015 at 5:41 AM, "Dan Cristian Octavian"  wrote:
>"It's  a novel idea to prevent detection of the PT-server by
tunneling in some  other traffic" instead of being sarcastic, maybe
you can focus on  wording your message better, I find it quite hard to
follow what you  write :)

I don't think it was sarcasm at all. It is a novel idea. It's exactly
what PT-servers need to do to avoid detection. Unfortunately there are
major flaws in your belief that bittorrent can be used to create cover
traffic. Mostly in that you've not made your implementation clear
enough. Do no harm. As it stands you rely on strength in number--the
peers in a bittorrent swarm. So if an adversary attacks the swarm
you've been spotted. If you try to go against the BT-spec you been
spotted. You don't have the luxury of hiding behind google or azure.
You've only got Bittorrent encryption to hide your data. Which means
you actually have no encryption because BT-spec encryption isn't
security oriented--it's obfuscation oriented for making traffic
shaping hard. (On a side note bittorrent failed miserably in this
regard) Which means, in the absence of swarm cover traffic, you've got
nothing to protect your data encoded inside bittorrent packets. An
adversary will then only have to compare your hash-failing pieces to
the known-good piece by looking at the hash.

I expected a response like "hey thanks for being so critical because
criticism will make this transport stronger", I expected "it might be
a good idea to consider this criticism seriously for the sake of those
I'm trying to help"

What I got was yet another assumption. Sarcasm requires an ego. A
focus on self. Yet I think I've made it clear that my focus is on the
ethical concerns behind what you're proposing for those who will be
using this transport. I should care you've got trouble following what
I write? After that kind of response I couldn't care less.
--leeroy
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