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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] A possible solution to traffic correlation attacks,
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On 2016-06-05 17:20, Allen wrote:
>> 
>> So randomizing the times that traffic enters the network and exits the
>> network wouldn't work? Like it enters a note and 30 ms after received 
>> or
>> another random delay couldn't it exit. It would be harder to correlate 
>> the
>> traffic right?
> 
> 
> IMO, the packets would probably need to be randomly delayed at each 
> node,
> not just entering and exiting the network.  A mathematical model would 
> be
> needed to determine the necessary amount of delay (I doubt 30 ms would 
> be
> enough).  The delay could be chosen by the originating node, so it 
> could
> chose the privacy vs latency tradeoff.
> 
> It might also be beneficial to have two channels to each exit node, 
> with
> each channel used in only one direction, i.e., outbound packets travel 
> one
> route, while inbound packets travel a different route.

That's a good idea. If we could get a system of micro delays which 
wouldn't cause major issues it'd be nice in protecting Tor users 
anonymity. It's an issue that has been acknowledged by the tor project 
but we haven't been able to find a working system yet. I think it's more 
important then ever that we begin to address these issues.
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