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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] A possible solution to traffic correlation attacks,
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On 2016-06-05 14:31, Flipchan wrote:
> Got any beta code on this? Maybe add/c ode it as a daemon ?;)
> 
> Not Friendly <notfriendly@riseup.net> skrev: (5 juni 2016 16:40:52 
> CEST)
>> After about an hour of brain storming I may of found a way to stop
>> traffic correlation attacks. The idea is to add an artificial delay of
>> a few randomized ms (two separate delays, one to the tor exit and
>> another deal on traffic exiting the network) and add an extra chunk of
>> randomized data (just a small random amount of KB that never exits the
>> network). It would make traffic harder to correlate. What are your
>> thoughts on this?
>> --
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> 
> --
> Sincerly Flipchan
I do not have any beta code. This was merely a suggestion. The added 
randomized delays (two separate sets) and randomized data padding (two 
separate sets) would make it more difficult to correlate traffic. I 
think it could be done in a way that still allows Tor to keep latency 
low.
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