Delivery-Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2016 02:18:59 -0400
Return-Path: <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on moria.seul.org
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,FREEMAIL_FROM,
	RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD autolearn=ham version=3.3.1
X-Original-To: archiver@seul.org
Delivered-To: archiver@seul.org
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (eugeni.torproject.org [138.201.14.202])
	(using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
	(No client certificate requested)
	by khazad-dum.seul.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EB4951E0A96;
	Fri, 10 Jun 2016 02:18:57 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 41FF6E147F;
	Fri, 10 Jun 2016 06:18:53 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9FB71E1486
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Fri, 10 Jun 2016 06:18:49 +0000 (UTC)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at 
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org ([127.0.0.1])
 by localhost (eugeni.torproject.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
 with ESMTP id 6F4HCFcSqC3J for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>;
 Fri, 10 Jun 2016 06:18:49 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from vfemail.net (onethreetwo.vfemail.net [199.16.11.132])
 (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
 (Client did not present a certificate)
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3393FE145B
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Fri, 10 Jun 2016 06:18:49 +0000 (UTC)
Received: (qmail 1221 invoked by uid 89); 10 Jun 2016 06:18:46 -0000
Received: from localhost (HELO freequeue.vfemail.net) (127.0.0.1)
 by localhost with (DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA encrypted) SMTP;
 10 Jun 2016 06:18:45 -0000
Received: (qmail 1212 invoked by uid 89); 10 Jun 2016 06:18:28 -0000
Received: by simscan 1.3.1 ppid: 1210, pid: 1211, t: 0.0022s scanners:none
Received: from unknown (HELO smtp101-2.vfemail.net) (172.16.100.61)
 by FreeQueue with SMTP; 10 Jun 2016 06:18:28 -0000
Received: (qmail 9530 invoked by uid 89); 10 Jun 2016 06:18:28 -0000
Received: by simscan 1.4.0 ppid: 9499, pid: 9526, t: 0.3185s scanners:none
Received: from unknown (HELO 127.0.0.1)
 (bXJub2JvZHlAbWFpbC1vbi51cw==@194.150.168.95)
 by mail.vfemail.net with ESMTPA; 10 Jun 2016 06:18:28 -0000
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
References: <8554176B-F17B-4FC6-AFBA-29DA392E4B28@riseup.net>
From: "mrnobody@mail-on.us" <mrnobody@mail-on.us>
Message-ID: <575A5B97.30805@mail-on.us>
Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2016 06:17:59 +0000
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <8554176B-F17B-4FC6-AFBA-29DA392E4B28@riseup.net>
X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.15
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] A possible solution to traffic correlation attacks,
X-BeenThere: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
Reply-To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
List-Id: "all discussion about theory, design,
 and development of Onion Routing" <tor-talk.lists.torproject.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/>
List-Post: <mailto:tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="===============3146603865906400731=="
Errors-To: tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org
Sender: "tor-talk" <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>

This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156)
--===============3146603865906400731==
Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512;
 protocol="application/pgp-signature";
 boundary="2uO5ff1N3Wj6spOWL4W2Rgg7tcMtQ0abM"

This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 4880 and 3156)
--2uO5ff1N3Wj6spOWL4W2Rgg7tcMtQ0abM
From: "mrnobody@mail-on.us" <mrnobody@mail-on.us>
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Message-ID: <575A5B97.30805@mail-on.us>
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] A possible solution to traffic correlation attacks,
References: <8554176B-F17B-4FC6-AFBA-29DA392E4B28@riseup.net>
In-Reply-To: <8554176B-F17B-4FC6-AFBA-29DA392E4B28@riseup.net>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Seems like an interesting idea, but this at the end translates into you
opening a webpage,
and it not loading for minutes. Only adding seconds or milliseconds
wouldn't avoid correlation,
or it wouldn't become much more expensive.

One other idea that comes to my mind would be to cache on the network
some amount of the
requests, or replicate part of the content of say, hidden services in
other nodes. In this way,
requests to hidden services may not reach at all the hidden service
itself, but a replica of it.
This is in a way similar to what Freenet does.


Not Friendly:
> After about an hour of brain storming I may of found a way to stop traf=
fic correlation attacks. The idea is to add an artificial delay of a few =
randomized ms (two separate delays, one to the tor exit and another deal =
on traffic exiting the network) and add an extra chunk of randomized data=
 (just a small random amount of KB that never exits the network). It woul=
d make traffic harder to correlate. What are your thoughts on this?



--2uO5ff1N3Wj6spOWL4W2Rgg7tcMtQ0abM
Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc"
Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc"

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=2gjz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

--2uO5ff1N3Wj6spOWL4W2Rgg7tcMtQ0abM--

--===============3146603865906400731==
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline

-- 
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

--===============3146603865906400731==--

