Delivery-Date: Tue, 07 Jun 2016 17:03:05 -0400
Return-Path: <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on moria.seul.org
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,
	T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD,UNPARSEABLE_RELAY autolearn=ham version=3.3.1
X-Original-To: archiver@seul.org
Delivered-To: archiver@seul.org
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (eugeni.torproject.org [138.201.14.202])
	(using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
	(No client certificate requested)
	by khazad-dum.seul.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E81FF1E0D39;
	Tue,  7 Jun 2016 17:03:03 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B65D7E1099;
	Tue,  7 Jun 2016 21:02:52 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 102A0E107D
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Tue,  7 Jun 2016 21:02:49 +0000 (UTC)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at 
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org ([127.0.0.1])
 by localhost (eugeni.torproject.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
 with ESMTP id 2sn2ZJEUzXsd for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>;
 Tue,  7 Jun 2016 21:02:49 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from mx1.riseup.net (mx1.riseup.net [198.252.153.129])
 (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits))
 (Client CN "*.riseup.net",
 Issuer "COMODO RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA" (not verified))
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C1E24E0EF4
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Tue,  7 Jun 2016 21:02:48 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from piha.riseup.net (unknown [10.0.1.163])
 (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
 (Client CN "*.riseup.net",
 Issuer "COMODO RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA" (verified OK))
 by mx1.riseup.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2A89D1A1A1E
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Tue,  7 Jun 2016 21:02:45 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) (Authenticated sender: phw)
 with ESMTPSA id BF7911C00F5
Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2016 17:02:43 -0400
From: Philipp Winter <phw@nymity.ch>
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Message-ID: <20160607210243.GD26138@riseup.net>
Mail-Followup-To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
References: <8554176B-F17B-4FC6-AFBA-29DA392E4B28@riseup.net>
 <CAD2Ti29UX8dZxz_McuC8GAaigWXgeAbWZR=QZBDfhLLP7Y_RtQ@mail.gmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29UX8dZxz_McuC8GAaigWXgeAbWZR=QZBDfhLLP7Y_RtQ@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] The Aqua design (was: A possible solution to traffic
 correlation attacks)
X-BeenThere: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
Reply-To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
List-Id: "all discussion about theory, design,
 and development of Onion Routing" <tor-talk.lists.torproject.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/>
List-Post: <mailto:tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Errors-To: tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org
Sender: "tor-talk" <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>

On Sun, Jun 05, 2016 at 02:34:22PM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
> You need fulltime regulated fill traffic, within which, your traffic resides.

The Aqua design goes in that direction.  It is a traffic
analysis-resistant anonymity system for BitTorrent:
<https://research.microsoft.com/pubs/199302/sigcomm13-aqua.pdf>

It handles traffic at the network edges differently than the core, to
achieve low-latency resistance to traffic analysis.  At the edges, it
dynamically groups clients with similar usage patterns together to
provide k-anonymity.  The network core consists of nodes that exchange
constant-rate traffic that is padded when necessary.

However, Aqua cannot protect against long-term intersection attacks and
the authors haven't really thought about incentives for joining the
network; I could see the network only being used for illegal file
sharing, making it an attractive target for blocking with low collateral
damage.
-- 
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

