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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] A possible solution to traffic correlation attacks,
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Le 06/06/2016 =E0 00:43, Paul Syverson a =E9crit :
> For this you might look at =

> "Preventing Active Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Anonymous Communication"
> Johnson et al. 2010, also on anonbib

"Let M be the message to be sent. We will encrypt the message with a
public key shared by all members of a layer. Given that the layers are
set up in advance and known to all, such a key can be generated by a
trusted third party or by electing a leader to do it"

Looks a little difficult to set in practice, and expensive in terms of
processing, no?

I have suggested something here
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2016-June/041084.html

The split of a Tor circuit into n Tor circuits is not originally thought
to protect against traffic correlation attacks but because the upload
bandwidth of the peers is likely to screw up the efficiency of an
incoming Tor circuit, so the idea is to split the circuits and split the
messages.

Again I have not studied it but then we can think that the timing of
packets becomes unpredictable, that it is difficult to compromise the
peers to perform active attacks, that unpredictable events might happen
like a peer leaving and breaking one of the splitted Tor circuits and
that adding some additional mechanisms like dropping randomely some
packets (or sending dummy ones) might probably render any traffic
correlation much more complicate.

I suppose that some papers exist about this (?)

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