Delivery-Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2015 03:22:12 -0400
Return-Path: <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on moria.seul.org
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,
	T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD autolearn=ham version=3.3.1
X-Original-To: archiver@seul.org
Delivered-To: archiver@seul.org
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (eugeni.torproject.org [38.229.72.13])
	(using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits))
	(No client certificate requested)
	by khazad-dum.seul.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 61CF11E0428;
	Wed, 24 Jun 2015 03:22:11 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6CBB2365A7;
	Wed, 24 Jun 2015 07:22:06 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 027503659B
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Wed, 24 Jun 2015 07:22:03 +0000 (UTC)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at 
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org ([127.0.0.1])
 by localhost (eugeni.torproject.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
 with ESMTP id q2Ch8e_VQq8r for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>;
 Wed, 24 Jun 2015 07:22:02 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from khazad-dum.seul.org (khazad-dum.csail.mit.edu [128.31.0.47])
 (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits))
 (Client CN "moria.seul.org", Issuer "moria.seul.org" (not verified))
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DEFCB353BB
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Wed, 24 Jun 2015 07:22:02 +0000 (UTC)
Received: by khazad-dum.seul.org (Postfix, from userid 501)
 id 60CFF1E0DE1; Wed, 24 Jun 2015 03:22:00 -0400 (EDT)
Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2015 03:22:00 -0400
From: Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu>
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Message-ID: <20150624072200.GH7957@moria.seul.org>
References: <N1-jdAYOf3sTT@Safe-mail.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <N1-jdAYOf3sTT@Safe-mail.net>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-12-10)
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Circuits in Orbot
X-BeenThere: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
Reply-To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
List-Id: "all discussion about theory, design,
 and development of Onion Routing" <tor-talk.lists.torproject.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/>
List-Post: <mailto:tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Errors-To: tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org
Sender: "tor-talk" <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>

On Tue, Jun 23, 2015 at 04:27:43PM -0400, force44@Safe-mail.net wrote:
> Hello!
> 
> I am using Orbot for Android and was surprised to see that circuits are up to 5 nodes. I remember having read that TOR would not be more secure (and even could be UNsecure) if it would use more than 3 nodes to build a circuit.
> 
> Any explanation?

Tor clients build paths with 3+n hops, where n is the number that are
influenced by some third party. So for example, when you're doing a
hidden service rendezvous, you typically end up using 4-hop paths --
3 that you picked, and 1 that the other side picked.

In fact, for client-side introduction point circuits, in some cases you
could end up with 5-hop or 6-hop paths, since if an intro point fails,
the client just extends the existing circuit one more hop to the next
intro point to try it.

https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#ChoosePathLength

Hope this helps,
--Roger

-- 
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

