Delivery-Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 16:45:47 -0400
Return-Path: <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on moria.seul.org
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED,
	DKIM_SIGNED,FREEMAIL_FROM,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,T_DKIM_INVALID,T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD
	autolearn=ham version=3.3.1
X-Original-To: archiver@seul.org
Delivered-To: archiver@seul.org
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (eugeni.torproject.org [38.229.72.13])
	(using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits))
	(No client certificate requested)
	by khazad-dum.seul.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5E76C1E04AB;
	Thu, 18 Jun 2015 16:45:45 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0F27A362FD;
	Thu, 18 Jun 2015 20:45:39 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F37A835F82
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Thu, 18 Jun 2015 20:45:34 +0000 (UTC)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at 
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org ([127.0.0.1])
 by localhost (eugeni.torproject.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
 with ESMTP id CYUvv5sWmDnY for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>;
 Thu, 18 Jun 2015 20:45:34 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from mail-lb0-x235.google.com (mail-lb0-x235.google.com
 [IPv6:2a00:1450:4010:c04::235])
 (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits))
 (Client CN "smtp.gmail.com",
 Issuer "Google Internet Authority G2" (not verified))
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 958D23378E
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Thu, 18 Jun 2015 20:45:34 +0000 (UTC)
Received: by lbbqq2 with SMTP id qq2so59767475lbb.3
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Thu, 18 Jun 2015 13:45:31 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113;
 h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to
 :content-type; bh=i4PQRH2cGqa1ZmW2JR+tm5IVvs4+s8Ib8IexOfRq5+8=;
 b=XR+d5dT8Jp/YPtn53zIeiXBl9N8Z/amRRju58TWMrNy8RBPNKOrVBLJ79Xfr2xf7qa
 Le2u7BexRPS4M4YtWBIKPnUbjQTMdqSQZSmCeDMHtkmrcG7JSjAOfKQ7xXhOrXXmZGQT
 zTo7/zARVATmEz7ieI4ZMndZypWJ+W9kfBzcQuftXoiDeltDgCfZMltXLy9SMWXLnaIP
 Vps6fpylvmFucPpTU7WRYNQBmztrd6Jy0Yg5oltnZ3ObV3+d5CNahyDwrCcdwnhNNrxC
 cUo3Cng1h5gXXbGIFdftKV9KcgjuvxzWcqpXbsxsKiVAmp+HzIKUZUCZ6fl5PRDHmGw8
 qzhQ==
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.112.204.6 with SMTP id ku6mr14416042lbc.73.1434660331480;
 Thu, 18 Jun 2015 13:45:31 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.25.90.65 with HTTP; Thu, 18 Jun 2015 13:45:31 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <20150618115426.DE6D9E1328@smtp.hushmail.com>
References: <CAD2Ti2-xVw_W2YDqkdQHmcHyKBDQjfT5jvc-8m3EAU8UkqxrUA@mail.gmail.com>
 <20150618045108.GE7957@moria.seul.org>
 <20150618115426.DE6D9E1328@smtp.hushmail.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 13:45:31 -0700
Message-ID: <CAJVRA1TL19Nj7SkEJPUUoZs-xpV2TmYchFwTotPjW9OOj9u-cg@mail.gmail.com>
From: coderman <coderman@gmail.com>
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Matryoshka: Are TOR holes intentional?
X-BeenThere: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
Reply-To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
List-Id: "all discussion about theory, design,
 and development of Onion Routing" <tor-talk.lists.torproject.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/>
List-Post: <mailto:tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Errors-To: tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org
Sender: "tor-talk" <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>

On 6/18/15, l.m <ter.one.leeboi@hush.com> wrote:
> ...
> All that padding means nothing if an adversary can introduce latency
> or gaps *at arbitrary* locations in a path. An adversary that can see
> your guard, and who can also see the guards traffic can introduce the
> gaps/latency in traffic at any point in your path. You may not even
> see the attack without being able to visualize end-to-end bandwidth
> statistics. It might be due to a routing problem at a particular node
> in the path. Solving this adversary isn't easy because they can hide
> behind the design of the internet.

this is where multi-path transports, which resist attacks against
traditional in-order or stream oriented transports - inherently
encumbered by serial datagram sequence. sadly, such transports also
require user space stacks and significant complexity. [see past
threads on multi-homed, multi-path SCTP w/ DTLS/IPsec telescopes, as
just one possible shape of could be...]

future ideas, plausible or no,
 Matryoshka does not solve even the known problems, let alone beat Tor
at the privacy game.


... fun subjects for exploratory development, perhaps when Tor Project
gets a research endowment. :P

best regards,
-- 
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

