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Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2015 16:29:15 -0400
From: Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu>
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On Sun, Jun 14, 2015 at 09:30:06AM +0430, Farbod Ahmadian wrote:
> I live in Iran and we have so many censorship because of that i use Tor in
> Ubuntu.

Sounds great. I'm glad it's (mostly) working for you.

> I use this bridge's but they haven't good speed and some times can't
> connect to server:
> 198.50.145.190:33042
> 188.166.67.100:54167
> 185.61.148.73:60038

First, I should caution you against telling too many people the specific
bridge addresses you're using -- one issue is that they might read this
mailing list and decide to block them, and the second issue is that if
they want to monitor your traffic they now have a better idea of where
on the Internet to go watch if they want to see your traffic.

> My Tor version is 2.6.8 and i use Obfsproxy beside Tor and this is my torrc:

At least last I heard, Iran only blocks Tor by preventing connections
to the directory authorities:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12727
which means if you bootstrap your Tor and then *stop* using bridges,
it may well still continue to work -- and in that case you won't have
to worry about accidentally having slow bridges.

Of course, using obfs3 (or even obfs4) bridges is the more robust
approach, because they're harder to block or throttle by DPI attacks,
which is one of the censorship approaches that Iran has historically
liked the most.

But you should try bootstrapping with a bridge and then not using
any bridges after that, in case it works and you are happier.

--Roger

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