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Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2014 17:09:31 +0200
From: Martin Kepplinger <martink@posteo.de>
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Subject: [tor-talk] Thoughts on Guards
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So assuming that people here
https://www.blackhat.com/us-14/briefings.html#you-dont-have-to-be-the-nsa-to-break-tor-deanonymizing-users-on-a-budget
are serious and do a "straight-forward", yet clever passive-observer
attack on Users; Given that they are listening *really* well and
knowingly manage to become Guard + Exit of Users in order to deanonymize
them:

1. What would help (and not change any other anonymity-parameters)? When
my guard goes offline, don't "ever" pick it as guard again? servers can
change quickly, so probably not...

2. Would some kind of "web-noise" generation in Torbrowser help? like so
https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/white-noise-generator

3. Will the content of that talk be publicly available?

4. Tails does not remember guards right? Is that really the safest way
you know (for now)?

5. Everything can be mobile now. Maybe such
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2012-October/025975.html
location-aware guards should become the default?

thanks
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