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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Illegal Activity As A Metric of Tor Security and
 Anonymity
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Well, let's see this:

> 1) compute the cost of global traffic analysis.  we have big data mark
> to put a ball park on it, but the point is: the cost is non zero and
> non trivial.

We already know from the Snowden releases that the physical infrastructure =
for this is in place.  That it spans at least 33 nations covering all major=
 fiber links.  Within the US, all traffic is copied verbatim at major excha=
nges.  In other nations, metadata can be shared to complete the picture.

We know that the physical infrastructure and regulatory frameworks are ther=
e, thus that must be going somewhere and as its metadata, that implies traf=
fic analysis.

So, its a patchwork model and the costs are spread across many nations and =
information sharing to isolate sites is policy driven.



Regards,

Mark McCarron

> Date: Sun, 29 Jun 2014 16:14:18 -0700
> From: coderman@gmail.com
> To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Illegal Activity As A Metric of Tor Security and	=
Anonymity
> =

> On Sun, Jun 29, 2014 at 2:24 PM, Juan <juan.g71@gmail.com> wrote:
> > ...
> >         You=B4ve been officially threatened by one of the =B4leaders=B4=
 of the
> >         =B4tor family=B4 for (unlike me) politely point out tor=B4s obv=
ious
> >         flaws.
> =

> =

> "pointing out obvious flaws" - as in, "it's so easy to protect against
> traffic analysis!  just make one end invisible!"
> =

> ?
> =

> ...
> =

> in the interest of adding even a minuscule bit of signal back to this
> discussion, let's get technical.
> =

> 1) compute the cost of global traffic analysis.  we have big data mark
> to put a ball park on it, but the point is: the cost is non zero and
> non trivial.
> =

> 2) compare to other mechanisms of compromise, whether through remote
> exploitation, technical surveillance, surreptitious physical access,
> etc.
> =

> 3) compare to possible *well researched/designed* solutions against
> traffic analysis.
> =

> =

> =

> the math appears to be #1 is expensive on already maximized
> intelligence community budgets.  possible?  of course.  actually
> applied?  not so clear.[0]
> =

> re #2, it is cheaper in every sense, to pwn the application layer and
> end point directly. this is well documented by years of industry
> experience, and more recently through covert budget details leaked.
> =

> =

> finally, #3: this is fucking hard! to point a fine point on it.  if
> you've designed and implemented a low latency traffic analysis
> resistant anonymity protocol with great usability and modest
> requirements please post here with the info; i for one would love to
> see how you solved a few of the hard details involved. ;)
> =

> =

> best regards,
> =

> =

> =

> =

> =

> 0. i have more to say, but also en route to Paris.  'till then,
> -- =

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