Delivery-Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 16:57:23 -0400
Return-Path: <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on moria.seul.org
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,
	RP_MATCHES_RCVD autolearn=ham version=3.3.1
X-Original-To: archiver@seul.org
Delivered-To: archiver@seul.org
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (eugeni.torproject.org [38.229.72.13])
	(using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits))
	(No client certificate requested)
	by khazad-dum.seul.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D116B1E001B
	for <archiver@seul.org>; Fri, 27 Jun 2014 16:57:21 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C525E2C0D5;
	Fri, 27 Jun 2014 20:57:17 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6ACEF2C0D5
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Fri, 27 Jun 2014 20:55:02 +0000 (UTC)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at eugeni.torproject.org
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org ([127.0.0.1])
 by localhost (eugeni.torproject.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
 with ESMTP id 0Cl-kh5VlaEn for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>;
 Fri, 27 Jun 2014 20:55:02 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from DUB004-OMC3S15.hotmail.com (dub004-omc3s15.hotmail.com
 [157.55.2.24])
 (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AES128-SHA256 (128/128 bits))
 (Client did not present a certificate)
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0B6332BECB
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Fri, 27 Jun 2014 20:55:01 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from DUB121-W15 ([157.55.2.7]) by DUB004-OMC3S15.hotmail.com with
 Microsoft SMTPSVC(7.5.7601.22701); Fri, 27 Jun 2014 13:54:58 -0700
X-TMN: [Zc5YkZJC5APC8NNh8uRboVOcZPQAjbNc]
X-Originating-Email: [mark.mccarron@live.co.uk]
Message-ID: <DUB121-W157E34892F73BC339ED8E1C81B0@phx.gbl>
From: Mark McCarron <mark.mccarron@live.co.uk>
To: "tor-talk@lists.torproject.org" <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 21:54:58 +0100
Importance: Normal
In-Reply-To: <20140627153801.0000732c@unknown>
References: <DUB121-W32E5B8525EB5756FB0DD73C8190@phx.gbl>,
 <53AB3C75.4020105@gmx.com>, <DUB121-W401DDF2EB0B4F36357ADA2C8190@phx.gbl>,
 <53AB742E.5000400@riseup.net>, <DUB121-W1602424B2673FF14097129C8180@phx.gbl>,
 <53ABAAFA.1040406@riseup.net>,
 <CAJVRA1Tydi5nB544ggjZM2BvPXC=zGr_8AReO0qP_pxQ3me4UA@mail.gmail.com>,
 <CAD2Ti2_F_Zbt8uL5s=hNXaNapnof2KSOPZFVgN3B-qxp5JtQqA@mail.gmail.com>,
 <CAJVRA1QzUniu3cLgqLitZR7tp4TchrqD+Ak_Os0Hrm2Oe9aScw@mail.gmail.com>,
 <DUB121-W20A3812716DFD202050E82C81B0@phx.gbl>,
 <20140627153801.0000732c@unknown>
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 27 Jun 2014 20:54:58.0664 (UTC)
 FILETIME=[0E90CE80:01CF924A]
X-Content-Filtered-By: Mailman/MimeDel 2.1.15
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Illegal Activity As A Metric of Tor Security and
 Anonymity
X-BeenThere: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
Reply-To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
List-Id: "all discussion about theory, design,
 and development of Onion Routing" <tor-talk.lists.torproject.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/>
List-Post: <mailto:tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Errors-To: tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org
Sender: "tor-talk" <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>

We also need to consider that some unidentified flaws exist in the code, bu=
t I agree with you traffic analysis is certainly the major problem at prese=
nt.  Traffic obfuscation will not work against the NSA and it would cause p=
roblems with the network.

The only option is to offer hosting within the Tor network itself.  Such ho=
sting would need to be fragmented/distributed, or we could be exposing Tor =
providers to prosecution.  That is, pages and backend access are delivered =
by composing them from multiple random nodes.  It would probably best to st=
art with Nginx or Apache and then modify it.  That's a complex design, but =
robust and the traffic analysis would yield little-to-no actionable informa=
tion.

Does anyone have any other ideas?

Regards,

Mark McCarron

> Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 15:38:01 -0300
> From: juan.g71@gmail.com
> To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Illegal Activity As A Metric of Tor Security and =
Anonymity
> =

> On Fri, 27 Jun 2014 10:53:46 +0100
> Mark McCarron <mark.mccarron@live.co.uk> wrote:
> =

> > Well, I think this is settling down into a proper discussion.  Whilst
> > the hypothesis is untested, leveraging illegal activity, especially
> > reviled illegal activity, as a metric for the quality of anonymity
> > and security provided by Tor is a sound strategy.
> > =

> > As mentioned before, the 'canary' is dead and we need to understand
> > why.  =

> =

> 	Easy. Tor, by design, is useless against
> 	governments that can do traffic analysis. For instance, the US
> 	government. =

> 	=

> 	Notice that this fact is mentioned in tor=B4s =B4fine print=B4 so to
> 	speak. Once in a while some developer would mention that
> 	traffic correlation is trivial if you can watch traffic in and
> 	out of the network. And then, it seems as if everyone forgets
> 	that little fact. =

> =

> 	And so we have amusing tor lackeys like =A8coderman=A8
> 	parroting propaganda that not even the tor developers
> 	themselves believe. =

> =

> 	So, how did the american gestapo get freedom hosting and silk
> 	road? Traffic analysis. =

> =

> 	Also, in case that  great =B4security=B4 =B4experts=B4 such as
> 	coderman and other tor lackeys on this list havent been reading
> 	the mainstream media : =

> =

> 	It is now common knowledge that the nsa gives information to
> 	=B4ordinary=B4 cops, and that  =B4ordinary=B4 cops then pretend =

> 	they got the information doing =B4police work=B4
> =

> 	=

> 	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction
> =

> =

> =

> =

> J.
> =

> =

> 	=

> =

> =

> =

> =

> 	=

> =

> 	=

> =

> =

> =

> Given that this is a global phenomenon, then we need to examine
> > the factors that effect this group.  The primary factor would be the
> > software itself.  A secondary factor would be the law, but this is
> > not a consistent factor across the world.
> > =

> > What other consistent factors are there?
> > =

> > Regards,
> > =

> > Mark McCarron
> >  		 	   		  =

> =

> -- =

> tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
 		 	   		  =

-- =

tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

