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From: Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Suggestion, hard-coded related domains
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On Wed, Jul 01, 2015 at 12:33:19AM -0700, Ryan Carboni wrote:
> Many websites operate their own CDN. Under the current Tor system each
> unique domain name is routed to an exit node. The obvious problem is that
> this provides another angle of attack for deanonymizing users if there are
> multiple domains controlled by a single party.

No, having a different circuit for every domain would be crazy -- mainly
because it would produce way way too many circuits (and thus load down the
network more), and secondarily because as you make and use more circuits,
you increase your exposure over time (which isn't the end of the world
due to the entry guard design, but is still not a great move probably).

Recent Tor Browsers aim to isolate *browser tabs* onto their own circuits.
Perhaps that is what you had in mind?

--Roger

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