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Discussions of measured entropy and stuff are too abstract for me. Maybe
someone can help me with a few simpleminded questions.

About 2.2 million clients are using Tor these days. Let's say that I've
toggled NoScript to block by default, and that I have a unique pattern
of enabling particular scripts on particular sites. That is, I'm unique
among all Tor users. In what ways does that put my Tor use at risk of
being linked to IP addresses seen by my entry guards?

Am I at risk because relay adversaries can more easily find me in their
sets of compromised circuits? If I were totally indistinguishable from
other Tor users, would finding me be millions of times harder? Or maybe
1e+9 to 1e+12 fold harder? What's the appropriate expression for that?

How does my uniqueness aid sub-global network adversaries?

What am I missing?
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