Delivery-Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 11:56:47 -0400
Return-Path: <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on moria.seul.org
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED,
	RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,RP_MATCHES_RCVD,T_DKIM_INVALID,UNPARSEABLE_RELAY
	autolearn=ham version=3.3.1
X-Original-To: archiver@seul.org
Delivered-To: archiver@seul.org
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (eugeni.torproject.org [38.229.72.13])
	(using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits))
	(No client certificate requested)
	by khazad-dum.seul.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 30C591E09F0
	for <archiver@seul.org>; Sat, 12 Jul 2014 11:56:45 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 50097304D5;
	Sat, 12 Jul 2014 15:56:43 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 99289303FF
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Sat, 12 Jul 2014 15:52:26 +0000 (UTC)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at eugeni.torproject.org
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org ([127.0.0.1])
 by localhost (eugeni.torproject.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
 with ESMTP id aC3Bbfdboaxb for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>;
 Sat, 12 Jul 2014 15:52:26 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from mx1.riseup.net (mx1.riseup.net [198.252.153.129])
 (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
 (Client CN "*.riseup.net", Issuer "Gandi Standard SSL CA" (not verified))
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 737BA30392
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Sat, 12 Jul 2014 15:52:26 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from fulvetta.riseup.net (fulvetta-pn.riseup.net [10.0.1.75])
 (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
 (Client CN "*.riseup.net", Issuer "Gandi Standard SSL CA" (not verified))
 by mx1.riseup.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6A93150AF4
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Sat, 12 Jul 2014 08:52:23 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=riseup.net; s=squak;
 t=1405180343; bh=aACnF0MWU0moNjpsEbhYox9BbKywlyD4zQb22S4IWU4=;
 h=Message-ID:Date:From:MIME-Version:To:Subject:References:
 In-Reply-To:Content-Type:Content-Transfer-Encoding;
 b=S8/F+fQpA5w5AY3GAcVyhTxhrYJBsrUqzH/cH2rMLStekPZJQp5P1u31Z/EWLhrY1
 wO3Or39mJjnkkO/P4SBqAJLJBDBR9xoqPJsmRgQU03YkIordRfRKB61Y3T0EtAuOYC
 iO2VfoTjcisc6EiH4+qmN81/b3Jh5PYX/JKVwKus=
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1])
 (Authenticated sender: adrelanos@fulvetta.riseup.net)
 with ESMTPSA id 16BFC1CB
Message-ID: <53C159B0.3090206@riseup.net>
Date: Sat, 12 Jul 2014 15:52:16 +0000
From: Patrick Schleizer <adrelanos@riseup.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
References: <53823B2A.2010104@bitmessage.ch> <5383AB5F.3010002@riseup.net>
 <53C14875.5090901@bitmessage.ch>
In-Reply-To: <53C14875.5090901@bitmessage.ch>
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] New Identity Warning without Control Port Access
X-BeenThere: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
Reply-To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
List-Id: "all discussion about theory, design,
 and development of Onion Routing" <tor-talk.lists.torproject.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/>
List-Post: <mailto:tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Errors-To: tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org
Sender: "tor-talk" <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>

Hi!

Nusenu:
>>> I'm running Torbrowser on a system that is transparently routed
>>> through Tor. Is it OK to disable the TorLauncher Addon within
>>> Torbrowser in such a setup or has that any negative
>>> consequences?
>>
>> Using TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH is tested by more people. See: 
>> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorifyHOWTO/WebBrowsers#UseTorBrowserwithoutbundledTorNIX
> 
> Thank
>>
> you for this info. This seems to work fine (TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH).
> 
> Since I use it I also get a proper error message that tells me that
> Torbutton cannot safely give me a new identity. It does not have
> access to the Tor Control Port.
> 
> Is is it considered a bug to *not* display this warning when *not*
> using TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1 in transparent torification mode?

I would consider it a bug. But since transparent torification is not in
development focus, I guess no one reported it and has little chances
getting fixed, unless someone writes a patch.

When using transparent proxying, it currently is up to the user to (not)
fix Tor Control Port settings and access.

>>> (background: I can't execute that script multiple times
>>> concurrently to open a new URL in an existing torbrowser
>>> session.)
>>
>> Try this: /home/user/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/firefox --profile 
>> "Data/Browser/profile.default" --new-tab "torproject.org"
>>
>> [Soon a tb-launcher package might get released by me for this
>> purpose. Then you can type "torbrowser --new-tab link" and a new
>> link will be opened in existing browser session.]
> 
> What is the current state on this?

A lot progress has been made on these packages. The packages have been
created, are currently being tested in Whonix, seem to work fine so far.
But I don't think a lot people have tested them outside of Whonix, such
as on Debian/Ubuntu yet. Currently they can only be created and
installed from source. There is no apt repository for them yet. If you
want to help with testing...

It can be found here:
- https://github.com/Whonix/tb-starter

Rather, you may also be interested in:
- https://github.com/Whonix/tb-updater
- https://github.com/Whonix/tb-default-browser
- https://github.com/Whonix/open-link-confirmation
- https://github.com/Whonix/control-port-filter
- https://github.com/Whonix/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor

Or other anonymity distribution specific packages:
- https://github.com/Whonix

These packages are produced independently of, and carry no guarantee
from, The Tor Project.

Cheers,
Patrick

-- 
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

