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From: Seth David Schoen <schoen@eff.org>
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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Hello I have a few question about tor network
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Oskar Wendel writes:

> Seth David Schoen <schoen@eff.org>:
> 
> > As I said in my previous message, I don't think this is the case because
> > the correlation just requires seeing the two endpoints of the connection,
> > even without knowing the complete path.
> 
> Is it possible to be sure that one of these connecting clients is in fact 
> a client and not just intermediate relay in the circuit?

As a guard node (or someone observing a guard node) trying to locate the
operator of a hidden service, you can use the IP address of the inbound
connection and the Tor directory to see if it's another Tor node or not.
I guess the hidden service operator could use a bridge to create more
ambiguity about what's happening; I don't know for sure if a guard node
has a way to distinguish an inbound connection from a bridge from an
inbound connection directly from a client.

-- 
Seth Schoen  <schoen@eff.org>
Senior Staff Technologist                       https://www.eff.org/
Electronic Frontier Foundation                  https://www.eff.org/join
815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, CA  94109       +1 415 436 9333 x107
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