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Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 02:08:09 +0100
Cc: cypherpunks@cpunks.org
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Network Analysis of Overlay Networks, Capabilities,
	Fill Traffic [was: VPN less safe?]
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> It would be harder for that analysis to succeed against networks
> that filled between all the nodes with fill traffic when unused and
> not needed for user traffic. (And in the sense of Tor, between clients
> and some number of guards). But that's hard to design so that it
> is functional. And no one in the overlay network / messaging field
> really seems to be trying it. Mindset, OMG bandwidth, probably
> buzzkills most research before it gets started.

I'll just name-drop these two hopefully-more-correlation-resistant
communication systems, in case people want to discuss them.

1) In relation to the "noisy traffic" you mentioned:

vuvuzela (WIP):
  https://github.com/davidlazar/vuvuzela

2) In relation to mixing networks:

bitmessage (by now fairly well known):
  https://bitmessage.org/
  https://github.com/Bitmessage/PyBitmessage
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