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"krishna e bera" wrote:
>They are tapping the cables and getting ip addresses of browsers,
then
>sharing that with other "intelligence" agencies.  E.g. you could be
>stopped at the border if someone in your house clicked on a monitored
site.
>Another reason to use Tor (not an uppercased acronym) all the time.

In the view of such intelligence agencies using Tor might make you an
extremist. It's more than enough reason for them to pay attention and
arguably as much as directly accessing any monitored site. If they tap
the cables, and consult shared intelligence, what are the chances that
using Tor will stop them. It's must be an inside joke at NSA to say
Tor is one of the technologies that they've not broken. A clever
misdirection to maintain face globally. They (probably) won't be able
to deanonymize all Tor clients at a moment in time. Neither will they
admit how many they can at a moment in time. An anonymous network used
only by intelligence agencies is useless to them. We live in an era
where 2million to create a hash collision, and still be considered
relatively secure, is chump change for countries that can hide behind
economic powerhouses.

There's a wealth of information that can be derived from the data you
make public. Threats aren't classified by access to monitored
sites--they're derived from all the data that can be gathered about
you. Have you ever read "Finding Paul Revere"? [1] Chances are (100%)
if you use Tor and have a private online presence (or lack thereof)
you've got a great big bulls-eye on you.

All you can do is make their job as hard as possible with as little
gain. Wear them down. Make them beg for every scrap. Make sure they
know it too.

-- leeroy

[1]
http://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2013/06/09/using-metadata-to-find-paul-revere/
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