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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] are there privacy benefits of running a bridge node?
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Virgil Griffith wrote
>  For example, if you run an exit node, your regular traffic is
disguised 
>  by exit traffic also coming from your ip#

I'm not sure I would call that use case more private. An observer
could 
categorize your traffic incoming from an intermediary relay and time
that 
traffic with outgoing traffic. The same observer could perform a
congestion 
attack on your exit and use that result to make differentiation more
accurate.

isis wrote
>  So, if you ran a Bridge like those, then you might see some
additional 
>  privacy benefits under some certain circumstances depending on how 
>  you sent your own traffic through the bridge.

Such as? The only two I can see are that you would know, assuming
opsec,
that you can trust the zeroth, and first-hop. That and if you support
PT on the
bridge you might consider that to be more resistant to analysis.
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