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Subject: [tor-talk] Opening guard relay to datacenter private network
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Many web hosting services offer private networking between hosts which are located in the same datacenter (basically an isolated /16 LAN). Typically these connections are very fast and the traffic sent over these networks does not count against either hosts' monthly bandwidth limit.

If a normal public guard relay also accepted connections via such a network, then any other server hosted in that datacenter could use it as a first hop. I think this would primarily be of interest to folks hosting hidden services. Those services would get a fast entry into the tor network via a publically known guard relay without making any connection to an ip associated with the tor network, or the public internet at all. Basically they would get the reliability of a guard and the obscurity of a bridge, plus the bandwidth of the hidden service would be free.

Would such a setup compromise anonymity in a way I haven't thought of? 

Would anyone who hosts a hidden service be reluctant to use this for other reasons?
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