Delivery-Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2016 23:37:43 -0500
Return-Path: <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on moria.seul.org
X-Spam-Level: 
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED,
	RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,T_DKIM_INVALID,T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD,UNPARSEABLE_RELAY
	autolearn=ham version=3.3.1
X-Original-To: archiver@seul.org
Delivered-To: archiver@seul.org
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (eugeni.torproject.org [38.229.72.13])
	(using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits))
	(No client certificate requested)
	by khazad-dum.seul.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 270E31E0B97;
	Thu, 25 Feb 2016 23:37:41 -0500 (EST)
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org (localhost [127.0.0.1])
	by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 572FE39B3D;
	Fri, 26 Feb 2016 04:37:35 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0A72339B20
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Fri, 26 Feb 2016 04:37:31 +0000 (UTC)
X-Virus-Scanned: Debian amavisd-new at 
Received: from eugeni.torproject.org ([127.0.0.1])
 by localhost (eugeni.torproject.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024)
 with ESMTP id gpVSSboBu1aN for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>;
 Fri, 26 Feb 2016 04:37:30 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from mx1.riseup.net (mx1.riseup.net [198.252.153.129])
 (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits))
 (Client CN "*.riseup.net",
 Issuer "COMODO RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA" (not verified))
 by eugeni.torproject.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DB5513993E
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Fri, 26 Feb 2016 04:37:30 +0000 (UTC)
Received: from cotinga.riseup.net (unknown [10.0.1.164])
 (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
 (Client CN "*.riseup.net",
 Issuer "COMODO RSA Domain Validation Secure Server CA" (verified OK))
 by mx1.riseup.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3071C1A1A50
 for <tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>; Fri, 26 Feb 2016 04:37:28 +0000 (UTC)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=riseup.net; s=squak;
 t=1456461448; bh=gO5JHpQ35VrOixcsyXWtZdlQAC/Bv5Y7DJ82p8sXAZ4=;
 h=Subject:From:To:Date:From;
 b=DyBs0d9VYZm5jbgYsrOMmJG8RPygS5mLt6zQXMkan7E0jxrpwnAgr9z9qjvudAsSr
 19yl1f72rWp0wSb1k3xTq3Sn+RKCXpHVDn8MLwn5g/zokFRD4IAZ7W/CMOUE+9sQRY
 XIdJZDwAD2RHSdcHmsT1Ugsv4uHPvh2di9aoDmKA=
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1])
 (Authenticated sender: eliaz) with ESMTPSA id 726684005B
From: eliaz <eliaz@riseup.net>
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Message-ID: <56CFD67D.2030108@riseup.net>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2016 04:37:17 +0000
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.98.7 at mx1.riseup.net
X-Virus-Status: Clean
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Fwd: Cryptopolitik and the Darknet
X-BeenThere: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
Reply-To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
List-Id: "all discussion about theory, design,
 and development of Onion Routing" <tor-talk.lists.torproject.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/>
List-Post: <mailto:tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk>, 
 <mailto:tor-talk-request@lists.torproject.org?subject=subscribe>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Errors-To: tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org
Sender: "tor-talk" <tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org>

> On 2/25/2016 5:13:34 PM, Zenaan Harkness (zen@freedbms.net) wrote:
> > On 2/25/16, eliaz <eliaz@riseup.net> wrote:
> > Elaboration: I said in my previous post that I never quite believed that
> > "there are more good than bad people."  I think it's more to the point
> > of upgrading tor architecture to say that I don't feel comfortable
> > relying on "there are more good than bad people" as a justification for
> > the Tor Project's laudable aims. Regardless of numbers there *are*
> > people who will misuse tor, and the article gives good evidence that
> > those people are the ones who employ anonymous content platforms. - eliaz
> 
> There is a principle: to give up anonymous publishing for the ~2% of
> bad actors, you will give up that right for the rest of us as well.
> 
> Same goes for other rights, not just anonymity.
> 
> By allowing people to drive on public roads, we accept that
> occasionally some nutcase will also drive on the roads, run down a
> pedestrian or cop and or cause a lot of damage to property. It's part
> of the bargain.
> 
> Then some people will suggest "time for full time GPS tracking of all
> vehicles, you know, to stop the crazies", thereby giving up our right
> to anonymous travel.
[snip]
I still don't get it. If one believes in something, why not publish it
non-anonymously? Most of the examples given for anonymous publication
speak of small percentages of crazies. The Cryptopolitik article doesn't
show a small percentage of illicit hidden services. Of the 2,723 hidden
cervices that unambiguously met the taxa used, ~57% were illicit.
Analogies to crazies on the roads, etc., take on a different complexion
with such numbers. Gun violence in this country is pretty bad, but 57%?

It's easy to be a libertarian or anarchist at home. These perspectives
have contributed a lot to society; at the same time there's good reason
why they don't work as sole governing principles. For even
self-governance to work, liberty has to entertain constraints. The
Cryptopolitik study & article attempts to set the groundwork for a
non-bureaucratic, non-centralized but purely architectural way this
might be done.

That some people might have a non-criminal reason to host anonymous
sites is a valid concern. But, if "anonymous publication" isn't an
oxymoron, those folks will surely find ways to do it.

Maybe tor-talk isn't the place to talk about these issues. Thanks for
the opposite viewpoints. I'll shut up now, but will be interested to
follow any dialogue that ensues by folks who have waded thru the whole
article. - eliaz



-- 
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

