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Subject: [tor-talk] Persistent Tor start in Tails vs location aware Tor
 entry guards (LATEG)
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Hi,

> 
> intrigeri:
> meaningful control
> 

There are two ends to this spectrum:
Keep Guard - - - - - - Change Guard

'Keep Guard' keeps the same guard forever (unlikely, given that guards 
go offline and need replaced)

'Change Guard' changes the entry guard at every circuit (unlikely, given 
that we have theoretical equations defending against this)

Everything in between is what we have now, some are noted here [0].

Making decisions for people (users) is futile.

Providing people with the ability to control their circuit is the most 
usable resolution.

People who need to do so are already doing so, but through altering 
package files, which is underusable.

It can be encouraged, and contextualized, too:
"Relocating? Then click [Here]"

> 
> work is done by little-t-tor,
> 

There is a ticket [1] about the circuit visualization that touches on 
this.

Wordlife,
Spencer

[0]: https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Tor#Non-Persistent_Entry_Guards
[1]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16665



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