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From: Andreas Krey <a.krey@gmx.de>
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Subject: [tor-talk] Exit MITMing plausible?
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Hi all,

a short question regarding potential state-rogue
exit nodes: Does tor browser pin the certificates
(even/at least in-session) so one could detect when
the certificate offered changes to to a bad exit
which does MITM? (Obviously restricted to
state actors.)

Besides, what/how many big exits aren't operated by
known entities?

Tails obviously can't store across sessions,
and doing do in tor browser would leave
traces of accessed sites on disk. Hmm.

Andreas

-- 
"Totally trivial. Famous last words."
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@*.org>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2010 07:29:21 -0800
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