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From: Aeris <aeris+tor@imirhil.fr>
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Date: Thu, 31 Dec 2015 13:43:09 +0100
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Cc: Oskar Wendel <o.wendel@wp.pl>
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Hello I have a few question about tor network
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> Does it apply also to traffic going from/to hidden services? How safe are
> users of hidden services when compared to users that browse clearnet with
> Tor?

Correlation is possible but very more difficult, because 3 nodes for client=
 to=20
rendez-vous points, then 3 others for rendez-vous to HS.

Strength of HS is also to not have clearnet output, even if the =C2=AB exit=
 =C2=BB node=20
of one of the circuits id compromised, an attacker can=E2=80=99t access cle=
ar data.=20
Not the case on the standard case, when compromised exit node have access t=
o=20
all the user data if HTTPS is not used.

Regards,
=2D-=20
Aeris
Individual crypto-terrorist group self-radicalized on the digital Internet
https://imirhil.fr/

Protect your privacy, encrypt your communications
GPG : EFB74277 ECE4E222
OTR : 5769616D 2D3DAC72
https://caf=C3=A9-vie-priv=C3=A9e.fr/
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