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From: grarpamp <grarpamp@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Tor 0.2.6.2-alpha is now released!
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>   o Major features (hidden services):
>     - Make HS port scanning more difficult by immediately closing the
>       circuit when a user attempts to connect to a nonexistent port.
>       Closes ticket 13667.

Not sure that this relatively security through obscurity is going to
do much other than overload the network with HS circuit creation,
and even the HS, which dedicated parties will do even if they need
some fraction of 2^16 clients in parallel to do it quickly. Auth seems
the better overall way. Still reading the ticket though...
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13667
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