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Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 20:23:20 +0100
From: Tyler Durden <virii@enn.lu>
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References: <20141219221905.GU8030@moria.seul.org>
 <54988708.9070806@riseup.net> <20141222211839.GF8014@moria.seul.org>
 <54989935.1020307@riseup.net> <5498A00C.70301@enn.lu>
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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Possible upcoming attempts to disable the Tor network
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Yeah I see but I still think that we need to add some more to prevent a
massive interrupt of the network.
If I would be an evil government attacker I wouldn't go for the
thousands of relays or exits but for the very small amount of trusted
DirAuths.
 =


Greetings

On 2014-12-23 00:16, Thomas White wrote:
> Generally some criteria for DirAuths are people who are trusted by the
> community, aren't raided very often/have legal troubles/could be
> legally compromised, people with an extensive understanding of how Tor
> works and people who can secure their systems from attacks. Remember
> every time a dirauth is added or change IP a new tor version must be
> released as they are hardcoded so it isn't a simple process to add a
> new one, not to mention intra-dirauth communication and verification.
>
> -T
>
> Tyler Durden:
>
> > On 2014-12-22 23:20, Mirimir wrote:
> >> On 12/22/2014 02:18 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> >>> On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 02:03:04PM -0700, Mirimir wrote:
> >>>> In light of recent posts from Thomas White and some node
> >>>> operators, I'm wondering whether "seizure" might be looking
> >>>> more like "compromise". There might be a range of attacks,
> >>>> from DDoSing to rooting, and perhaps even the covert
> >>>> installation of malicious hardware. Or is that too
> > alarmist?
> >>>
> >>> So far all is quiet on the directory authority front, and no
> >>> news is good news.
> >>>
> >>> As for Thomas's servers, I should emphasize that Tor exit
> >>> relays aren't the same as Tor directory authorities. There are
> >>> 1000+ exit relays in the Tor network, and it is normal (and
> >>> safe) for them to come and go for all sorts of reasons. He took
> >>> his relays down himself to be conservative while investigating,
> >>> but currently he's not thinking it has to do with law
> >>> enforcement. When he took them down, the Tor network
> >>> temporarily lost a little bit of exit capacity, but that too is
> >>> normal.
> >>>
> >>> There are six thousand plus relays in the Tor network right
> >>> now, and things are happening as usual. There's no indication
> >>> currently that anything in particular has happened recently.
> >>>
> >>> --Roger
>
> >> Thanks for clearing that up. Sorry to confuse things. I saw in
> >> the list of trusted authorities at
> >> https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3D8774833 that Riseup runs
> >> one, and somehow didn't see that Thomas was reporting on exit
> >> relays and mirrors.
>
> >> I ought to chill, I suppose.
>
> > So is there no need for some more trusted dir authorities? I mean
> > 10 for the whole networks seems a bit tiny.
>
>
>

-- =

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Fr=EBnn vun der =CBnn A.S.B.L.
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