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From: grarpamp <grarpamp@gmail.com>
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Idea: Public verification of exit nodes and their
 maintainers - Fwd: [tor-relays] specifying your own entrance and exit nodes
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From the exact same thread duplicated a month ago that is worth
reading for what everyone said there:


Assume you have a base set of some web of trusted nodes, which
is then easier/cheaper for an adversary on average...

A) Sybil up enough individual faces that can prove own their node
in person at meetups, give google checkable stories, are networked
in Tor/related communities enough, and pass the human bullshit
detector... to have an effective attack percent of nodes, maintained
as the "legit" node count grows.

B) Pay $/mo per IP to "cooperative" ISP's (or be a shell), to sybil
up nodes you have zero insight into other than an IP address.

Then consider which trust metrics you might use in your config.
Sure, many caveats too, if the above ancient question has an answer,
then so do you.
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