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From: Lars Luthman <mail@larsluthman.net>
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Date: Tue, 05 Aug 2014 23:39:40 +0200
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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Is there a benefit to using the .onion address over
 a clearnet one?
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On Tue, 2014-08-05 at 16:19 -0500, Cypher wrote:=20
> I use a service that provides both a clearnet address and an onion
> address. I only access this service through Tor and I usually do it via
> the clearnet address. Are there any benefits to accessing such a service
> via its onion address?

If the service uses an unencrypted protocol the obvious benefit of the
hidden service is that the data is encrypted all the way to the host.

Also, even if it is encrypted, a hidden service should at least in
theory be more resistant to a man-in-the-middle attack than normal TLS,
unless you use certificate pinning in the client.


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