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Date: Mon, 25 Aug 2014 19:20:23 -0400
From: TerryZ@Safe-mail.net
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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Third-parties tracking me on Tor
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Hey Cypher,

I'll keep that in mind.


Thanks

-------- Original Message --------
From: Cypher <cypher@cpunk.us>
Apparently from: tor-talk-bounces@lists.torproject.org
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Third-parties tracking me on Tor
Date: Mon, 25 Aug 2014 17:16:28 -0500

> On 08/25/2014 05:02 PM, TerryZ@Safe-mail.net wrote:
> 
> <snip>
> 
> > 
> > The only thing I'm sure wasn't compromised is what I encrypted myself using my PGP key. I altered the GPG source code to create longer keys. 
> 
> Just a quick comment on creating a longer key. I see a lot of people
> doing that and I think it's absolutely useless. As of now, we do not
> believe that anyone has the computing power to break a 4096 bit RSA key
> by brute force. The only way would be through a side attack. If a side
> attack worked against a 4096 bit key, it would likely also work against
> a 8k key as well.
> 
> There's no real benefit to creating a larger than 'standard' key at this
> point.
> 
> Cypher
> 
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