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Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 22:32:10 +0200
From: Aymeric Vitte <vitteaymeric@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Wired Story on Uncovering Users of Hidden Services.
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I would love to think that it's not impossible but it seems to be, =

whatever documentation exists (which most of Tor users will not read), =

it can not predict OS and FF hazards, even if the Tor Browser forbids =

everything that is potentially dangerous (and in that case most of the =

sites will just not work still without insuring you are safe), one =

alternative is to fetch (like peersm), not to browse but then the use is =

different.

Regards,

Le 15/08/2014 18:31, Joe Btfsplk a =E9crit :
> On 8/14/2014 6:18 PM, Mirimir wrote:
>> On 08/14/2014 04:48 PM, Aymeric Vitte wrote:
>>> I am "defensive" because you seem to make a general case of something
>>> that can only happen in case of browser's/OS bug, and conveying to Tor
>>> users that they should not use js is a non sense, you make believe them
>>> that intrinsically js can easily leak their ip and/or mac addresses,
>>> which is wrong, this can happen under extraordinary circumstances that
>>> have nothing to do with js, here a windows/ff bug, which could have =

>>> been
>>> a css attack or whatever.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>> This was indeed an extraordinary circumstance. And it is misleading to
>> focus on the importance of blocking Javascript. It's also evidence for
>> using the latest Tor browser release, avoiding Windows, etc.
>>
>> However, I do see a "told you so" here. It's foolish to think that
>> simply using the Tor browser is adequate protection for doing stuff
>> where there are serious consequences. Maybe the the comment "Everything
>> you need to safely browse the Internet. This package requires no
>> installation. Just extract it and run." on the download page needs a
>> "don't do stupid stuff" warning. Also, maybe the "Want Tor to really
>> work?" section needs to reiterate the "don't rely on Tor for strong
>> anonymity" warning. Maybe even something about firewall rules. Yes?
> Others can weigh in, but (as with most software) the information of =

> what all one needs to do & not do, in order to *not potentially* =

> compromise anonymity while using Tor is quite spread out.
> It can take a long time for users to learn even the basics of what =

> "else can go wrong," besides just installing TBB & hitting go.
> Yes, there's a short, basic list / FAQ that warns of some of these =

> things.  It's hardly complete or "sufficient for most users," IMO.
>
> No doubt, anonymity w/ Tor is complicated - even for experts & putting =

> together documentation (in one place) to cover most of the pitfalls is =

> tough.  But perhaps not impossible.
> Probably a better job could be done (than present) to revise / =

> reorganize documentation on "what *else* you need to do / consider, to =

> keep Tor more anonymous."
> Unfortunately, most users don't have the deep knowledge of Tor & TBB =

> necessary to write correct, concise documentation for many of the more =

> involved topics.
>>
>>> Le 14/08/2014 11:06, Anders Andersson a =E9crit :
>>>> On Wed, Aug 13, 2014 at 11:56 PM, Aymeric Vitte
>>>> <vitteaymeric@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>>     As
>>>>>> someone who argues against using javascript in any context, I can =

>>>>>> only
>>>>>> say "told you so", but that doesn't really help anyone. :)
>>>>> No and you are wrong
>>>>   From
>>>> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-announce/2013-August/000089=
.html =

>>>>
>>>>
>>>> "An attack that exploits a Firefox vulnerability in JavaScript has
>>>> been observed in the wild."
>>>> People who didn't allow javascript were safe.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>> Because they managed to get in to the client browser, they could =

>>>>>> learn
>>>>>> the real IP address and MAC address
>>>>> and the color of your shirt
>>>> Why are you so defensive? Is it your code they broke? They could learn
>>>> the color of my shirt if the browser user has access to a webcam,
>>>> which is not uncommon. This is however highly irrelevant.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>> , they didn't learn this through
>>>>>> Tor.
>>>>> Are you serious in your answer?
>>>> Very much so. If you don't believe me, then maybe you'll believe these
>>>> sources:
>>>>
>>>> https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-announce/2013-August/000089=
.html =

>>>>
>>>>
>>>> https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2013/mfsa2013-53.html
>>>>
>>>> Nothing was exploited through Tor. In fact, they couldn't find out who
>>>> was using the server *because* people used Tor. So they had to resort
>>>> to javascript exploits.
>

-- =

Peersm : http://www.peersm.com
torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live
node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor
GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms

-- =

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