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Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Clarification of Tor's involvement with DARPA's Memex
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aka:
> The common user does not apply to all threat models. If you are a high
> volume recreational drug salesman, you must expect 0days and snitches.

if you're a drug salesman, you're a different type of criminal that has
high value to multiple law enforcement agencies. personally, i don't
care about helping such players learn the game better.

> If you however are merely a recreational drug consumer, Tor can cover
> all of your security risks, because only low cost automated
> investigation will be used against you. 

and it's utterly worthless when you give a black market salesman a
mailing address. something the nsa likely couldn't care less about.

> There are many ways to implement better anoynmity than Tor at a useful
> scale, if low latency is sacrificed. 

low latency does not need to be sacrificed. a different opsec game needs
to be played if you have information that a global adversary would care
to prosecute you for. i personally don't care for two-bit criminals. but
people who have evidence of crimes by global adversaries? they need to
be able to learn how to share evidence without fear of prosecution. tor
alone won't do that, and the tor project has never claimed otherwise,
which makes a lot of the recent hysteria i've seen about tor
particuliarly annoying.

-- 
gpg key - 0x2A49578A7291BB34
fingerprint - 63C4 E106 AC6A 5F2F DDB2 3840 2A49 578A 7291 BB34

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